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Powerand
Intergovernmental
Dependence*
Ron Mock
"(The effective
willunderstand
intergovernmental
manager)
that
intergovernmental
relations
arein factintergovernmental
'negotiations'in whichthe partiesare negotiating
in deadearnestfor
power,money,andproblemsolving
responsibility."
In this statement Allen Pritchard' has identified the
central issue in intergovernmental
management.If our
system of intergovernmental
relations (IGR) reflects,as
Wrightsuggests,2society's ongoing effortto provide a
systematic solution to public problems, then it is of
paramount importancethat any who would understand
IGR grasp how the triad of "power, money, and
responsibility"are distributedamong the many units of
government.
Money is necessary for any unit of governmentto
function. If we were to draw a parallel to industry,
money would be by far the most importantof governmental raw materials. The possession of this resource
determineslargely the availabilityof all others,such as
manpoweror equipment.
Problem solvingresponsibilitycorrespondsto James
Thompson's concept of domain.3 In intergovernmental
management,domain is the claim a unit of government
stakes out foritselfin the rangeof problemsit addresses,
the people it serves,and the set of specificprogramsit
provides. The organizationestablishes domain by winning consensus on its boundaries fromunits in its "task
environment."4 For governments,these units include
clients, suppliers of resources, competing agencies or
jurisdictions,and regulatorygroups (other governments
and unions, for example). The people are the ultimate
arbitersof domain since they can play any of the four
roles as clients, taxpayers, private competitors, and
voters.
Power is the most importantof the three factorsin
intergovernmental
"negotiations." In IGR, power is the
means by which a unit of governmentestablishes and
protects its domain. This paper will focus on power as
the key to understandingthe structureof the intergovernmentalsystem,and the distributionof resourcesand
*Theauthorwishesto expresssincereappreciation
to thefaculty
at DrakeUniversity
whoprovidedtheencouragement
neededto
completethis paper. My specialdebt of gratitudegoes to
Professor
WilliamCollinsforhissponsorship
andguidanceofthe
effort,and to Professor
WalterRoettgerforhis valuableand
frank
editorial
critiques.

responsibilityin it.5 It will describe how power can be
measured,strategieswherebyit can be won or preserved,
and the effectseach strategicoption will have on the
intergovernmental
structure.

Powerand Dependence
This strategicmodel is derived from an analysis of
power relationshipsdeveloped by RichardEmerson."
Powerto controlor influence
theotherresidesin controlover
thethings
he values.... In short,
in the
powerresidesimplicitly
other'sdependence.
Dependence(Dab). The dependence
of actorA uponactorB is
(1) directly
to A's motivational
proportional
ingoals
investment
mediatedby B, and (2) inversely
to theavailability
proportional
ofthosegoalsto A outsidetheA-Brelation.
The keystoneto Emerson's approach is the statement
that the power of actor B upon actor A is equal to the
dependence of A on B. Thus, Pba=Dab. It is not enough
to describe the relationship from A's perspective as
Pab=Dba. We must also understandit fromB's perspective as Pba=Dab. The dynamic nature of this concept
arises out of the possibilitythat A's dependence on B
can be unequal to B's dependence upon A; and that
eitheractor can take action to change a power disadvantage (being relativelymore dependentupon the other) to
a power equivalency (equal dependence on both sides)
or even a power advantage (being relativelyless dependent than the other actor). If, as several theoristshave
pointed out, power can run both ways,7 we can always
describe a power relationshipin one of the following
threeways:8
Pba=Dab

Pba=Dab

Pba=Dab

Pab=Dba

Pab=Dba

Pab=Dba

V

V

II

II

A

A

Alternatives
to Compliance
When an actor in a power relationshipfindshimself
under pressurefromany otheractor he may yield, or he
may adopt one or more of four strategiesdesigned to
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manipulatethe powerrelationto retainindependence. usefulhere,especiallyif accompaniedby better,more
performance.
The objectiveis a three-pronged
From his conceptof dependenceEmersonderives effective
of clients,programs,
and constituents.'
6
fouralternatives
to compliance.9The firsttwo alterna- diversification
Decreasingmotivational
in thegoalsconinvestment
alternative
routesto the goal outside
tives-developing
is a processof
one's own trolledby the otherunitof government
thepowerrelationin question,anddecreasing
and willlikelybe thelastresortafterall
in the goals controlledby the valueformation,
motivational
investment
havefailed.'7 It is ideologicalbecauseit
other-havethe effectof reducingthe power of the otherstrategies
actor.The secondtwo alternatives-increas-requirestheweakpartyto decideit can do withoutthe
threatening
in one's own goal controlledby the strong,adjustingits aspirational
investment
ing the other'smotivational
values to a lower level. JasonBoe, presidentof the
resourcesby supplyingresourcesthe otherneeds to
of StateLegislatures
illustrated
the
achievehisgoals,or closingoffalternatesourcesof the NationalConference
when he
one's ownpower option of reducedmotivationalinvestment
thingsone currently
supplies-increase
0
warnedthe statesthat if theysucceededin forcinga
in therelationship.'
Thesefourbasicoptionswhenappliedto intergovern- balanced federalbudget,"they must be awareof the
mentaladministration
can suggestsome strategiesfor price(in termsof less federalaid), be preparedto pay
forliving
units in each type of powersituation: for it, and be willingto shareresponsibility
governmental
withit."'18
orbalanced.
weak,strong,
oftheWeak
Strategies
can workto correcttheir
Weakunitsof government
in severalways.
powerdisadvantage
Developingalternateroutesto the goal means,of
course,comingup with new suppliesof needed resources,particularly
money.It can also meandeveloping
new customersor clientsforthejurisdiction's
products
orservices.
It is obvioushowan organization
canbe dependent
if
it is limitedin sources of supply. A monopolistic
suppliercan easilyexercisepowerby threatening
to cut
offvitalsupplies;however,
an organization
can be justas
dependenton consumersof its output.BurtonClark
illustratedthis in his study of an adult education
organizationwhich,because it lacked securemarkets,
founditselfhavingto caterto everyfleetingwhimof
whatever
clienteleit couldpersuadeto useitsservices.'1
In a recent issue of Public AdministrationReview,

Charles Levine suggestsseveral tactics for building
alternative
resources:broadening
thejurisdiction's
revenue base; seekingsupportfrombusinesses,
foundations,
or otherunitsof government;
and adoptingnew methods of raisingrevenue,particularly
userfees.'2 Another
tacticis embodiedin the LakewoodPlan developedin
Los AngelesCounty,whichopenedthedoorforsmaller
citiesandspecialdistricts
to contractwitheachotherfor
municipalservicesas alternatives
to supplyingthem
themselves
or goingthetraditional
routeof contracting
3
withthecountyor thecityof Los Angeles.1
An indirectway to "create" new resourcesis cost
reduction.Levinesuggests
improving
productivity,
automating,and increasinghierarchical
controlas waysto
economize.1I Derivedfromcost reducingis Thompson's

predictionthathard-pressed
organizations
willstriveto
consolidatecontrolof thosesectionsof theirenvironment over whichtheydo enjoy poweradvantages.s
Increasedhierarchical
controloveremployeeshas a hint
of thisstrategy
in it; resisting
unionization
ofemployees
is certainly
withinthisstrategy.
Creatingnew clienteles
is a tougher
task.Good public
relationsis essential:improvedproductivity
can be very

The rise of the "Big Seven" public interest
groups(PIGs) is an exampleof coalitionbuildas theyworktogether
ing,especially
inhandling
relations
withthenationalgovernment
on whom
theydepend.Theeffectof theBigSevenwould
be evengreaterweretheyto coordinatemore
closelytheir
pressure
on thefederal
government.
The oppositestrategy,
the strongactor's
increasing
motivational
in goalscontrolled
investment
by theweak
actor,can be brokeninto two substrategies:
coopting
and contracting.Coopting is the practice of "absorbing

newelements
intothepolicy-determining
structure
ofan
as a means of averting
organization
threats."'9 Thus,
ofvalue(status,in
cooptinginvolvesgranting
something
thiscase) to a powerfulagentin orderto increasehis
in theweakunit.Herecoopting
motivational
investment
involvesa broaderrangeof possibilities
thangranting
status:in intergovernmental
it meansmakinga
relations,
powerful
agentdependent
uponanyresourceoverwhich
theweakunitofgovernment
mayhaveinfluence.
A unit
of government
can coopt if it can make anotherunit
dependentupon it forimplementation,
or
enforcement,
thefavorable
outcomeofan election.
is the processof establishing
Contracting
an agreement(eitherformally
orinformally)
fortheexchangeof
in the future.'0 It has the effectof
performances
a relationship.Contracting
institutionalizing
may not
work to the advantageof the weak agentif its major
effectis to make concretea disadvantageous
arrangement. If the weak unit can make the securityof a
contractimportant
enoughto thestrongunit,however,
it canbalancetherelationship
somewhat.
Closingoff the powerfulactor's alternatives
is the
finalof the fourbasic strategies
open to weakgovernmentsin IGR. It can taketwoforms.
The firstis the most widelyrecognized:coalition
building.If theweakunitcan unitewithothersthatare
dependentupon the same strongunitof government,
and if they can act as one in theirdealingswiththe
strongactor,theymaybe able to close offalternatives
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to thelatter.The riseof the"Big Seven"publicinterest deal, it has become doubly dependentsince therewill be
groups (PIGs) is an example of coalition building, no other equivalent arrangements available except
especiallyas theywork togetherin handlingrelations through the same strong supplier or client. Whether
on whomtheydepend. intentional or not, rapid increases in grant programs
withthe nationalgovernment
The effectof the Big Sevenwouldbe evengreater
were under the Great Society aegis greatlyincreased national
they to coordinatemorecloselytheirpressureon the power, especially since so many of the grantprograms
federalgovernment.
offeredspecial deals in the formof matchingprovisions.
A second option available to the weak actor for
Wherethe weak tryto stimulatemotivationalinvestis coercionby a countervailing ment on the part of the strong,the powerfulwill tryto
closingoff alternatives
powersmayincluderegulatory remainindifferentto what the powerlessoffer.One way
power.'I Countervailing
laws. In eithercase, theoption to accomplish this is to maintain control over key
agenciesor prohibitory
of settingup countervailing
poweris onlyopen if there intergovernmentalresources, particularlymoney and,
is a thirdpartyin a positionto enforcecomplianceby where appropriate,voters.Moreover,wherethe weak try
the powerful,
andifthatthirdpartycanbe convinced
to to close off alternativesto the strong,the powerfulwill
undertakeregulationof the powerful.In intergovern- try to maintain them. Outlawingor hamstringing
coalimentalrelations,the mostcommonsourceof counter- tions of the weak and preventingthe establishmentof
vailingpoweris the federalgovernment.
Unfortunately, countervailingpowers or restrictiverules are the princirelianceuponit bystateor localgovernmental
unitsmay ple options here. The attempts on the part of many
exacerbatetheirdependenceupon the federalgovern- federal leaders to discourage the movement to call a
ment.A morepromising
avenuefromthestateandlocal constitutionalconventionis a case in point.
perspectiveis the states' appeal to an even higher
Powerfulunits of governmentalso have the option of
in theirattemptsto set reducing costs as a means of reducing dependence on
authority,the Constitution,
limitson federalactivityvia resolutionscallingfor a
others.It seems safe, however,to predictthat thistactic
constitutional
convention.Or, witnessthe tactics of will be employedless by the powerfulthanby the weak,
Moon Landrieu,former
MayorofNewOrleans,whenhe since the powerfulinherentlyare more likelyto have an
threatened
to denywelcometo thecityto thepowerful abundance of resources.
Hale Boggsunlesshe supportedgeneral
Congressman
2 Thisessentially
revenuesharing.2
wasa threatto appeal Strategiesof Equals
to thevoters,one of Boggs'"regulating
agents."
Justas the strongwill try to increase theirstrength,

the parties to a perfectlybalanced relationshipwill try
to make their positions more secure. Some of the
Emersonseemsto assumethatonce a poweradvan- strategiesavailable to them have the effectof stabilizing
tageis gained,itsmaintenance
requiresno further
effort. equal-power relationships, others have the effect of
PeterBlau makesno suchassumption.
Thus,thissection gaininga power advantage.
willdrawheavilyupon Blau.2
Most of the strategiesforequals can easilybe derived
The strategies
availableto thestrongunitsofgovern- fromthe discussionsof those available to the weak and
mentare, forthemostpart,availableto theweak.For the strong; however, significantimplicationsfor interexample,wherethe weak tryto developtheiralterna- governmentalmanagementin some of the equal-power
tivesby building
sourcesandmarkets,
thestrongwilltry strategieswill be highlightedhere.
to denytheseoptionsto theweakby maintaining
their
Even though a governmentalunit in a symmetrical
monopoly.Monopolymaintenancetacticsincludeen- power relationshiphas by definitionadequate alternaforcing
institutionalized
hierarchical
relationships,
estab- tives in suppliersand clients,it must maintainreadiness
lishinga "law" thatthe weak mustdeal withno one to react should its environmentchange to its detriment.

NormalStrategies
of theStrong

otherthanthestrong,
and contracting
withtheweakon
conditions
termsthatlock themintotheirdisadvantage.
Wherethe We mightexpect,forexample,thatunderfavorable
would practiceexchanging
witheach of its
weak tryto reducetheircosts,the strongcan impose the organization
severalpossiblesources,thusestablishing
witheach a precedent
costlyreporting
orperformance
requirements.
forsupport
ifconditions
4
becomelessfavorable.2
Wherethe weak tryto build an ideologyof "doing
without,"thestrongwilltryto reinforce
ideologiesthat The same treatment would be expected for client
place value on resourcestheycontrol.In intergovern- groups. States and localities in this condition can be
mentalrelations,thiscan take the formof mandating expected to get key personnel out of federally-paid
protectionof special populationsin ways that place positions. Further,governmentalunits in equal-power
extraburdenson the weak, or buildingup democracy balance will keep the doors open to coalitions and will
when the people are sympathetic
to the aims of the maintain good public relations,in case the force of a
strong.When the weak have not been successfulin united frontor an appeal to the votersis everneeded to
buildingideologiesof independence,the strongcan forestalla takeoverby an emergingpowerfulactor.
increasetheirpower by offering
new services(upon
Contractingcan play a very importantrole among
which,overtime,theweak willcome to depend)or by equals. By establishing contracts, equals ensure the
offering
special deals. The latteris especiallydevilish: continuationinto the futureof the relativelyfavorable
once a weak unitof government
has accepteda special arrangementof the present.They also forestalldalliance
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER
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and clientsand
by theirequals withalternative
suppliers
threatthat they will providethe
the accompanying
competitor
witha poweradvantage.
One otherstrategyshouldbe noted. Governmental
unitsdissatisfied
withequal-power
arrangements
maybe
able to increasetheirpower by initiatingnew pro-

One of the most promising
would be to
strategies
help the weak reduce the costs of theiroperations.
Reducingperformance
fortheweakis one
requirements
possibility;evenmoreusefulwould be assistancewith
management
and capacitybuilding.Iftheselast
training
two effortsare successfulenough,there would be
beneficial
impactsthroughout
theweakeragent'sorganigrams.2 6 This is how the ephemeralresourceof superior
intoconcretepoweradvan- zation, includingincreasesin the abilityand popular
leadershipcan be translated
supportnecessaryto assumemoreprogram
tages.
responsibilities.
Thereis littlea stronger
of theStrong
Devolving
Strategies
unitofgovernment
can do to
encouragethe weak to develop ideologiesof doing
It would be tempting
to assumethatthestrongwill without.That is an internalprocessand cannot be
It is also forcedon anyone.About all thatthestrongcan do to
alwayswantto increasetheirpoweradvantage.
conceivable,
however,thattheremaycomea movement helpthisprocessis to holdoffon offering
newresources
in intergovernmental
forthestronger
units orspecialdeals.
management
of government
to reducetheirpoweradvantages
volunThe strongcan act to makethemselves
moredepentarily.
dent on the weak. Followingup on TerrySanford's
That such a strategycan emergewas graphically observation
thateverylevel of government
dependson
demonstratedwhen PresidentEisenhowersoughtto everyotherlevel of government
to getitsjob done,28
decentralize
powersto the statesin the late 1950s by the strongunit can increaseits dependenceby giving
creatinga high-level
taskforceto suggest
areasof federal away responsibilities
important
to its own functioning.
thatcould be delegatedto thestates.The Enforcement
responsibility
of laws is one vital functioncommonly
effort
failed.MortonGrodzinsassertsthatno sucheffort carriedout by a different
unitof government
thanthe
could eversucceed.27 Accordingto power-dependence one thatmadethelaws.
analysis,however,thereare a widevarietyof strategies
One interesting
idea mightbe an adaptationof the
the powerfulmightemployto reducetheirown power cooptingprocess.If the strongwereto createadvisory
Thisconditionwouldariseshouldleadersbe boardsmadeup ofrepresentatives
advantages.
oftheweakand allow
electedto head the strongunitwho wereideologically them to have input on the actions of the strong,
committed
to a moreequal distribution
of intergovern- balancingof the powerrelationship
shouldtake place.
mentalpower. Such a commitment
mightarise, for The strongwould to some degreehavelimitedits own
example,out of a beliefthatthesafeguards
providedby optionsby allowingitselfonly thoseoptionsapproved
"balance of powers"are endangered
whenone unitor (or not too strenuously
condemned)by theweak.The
or it could stemfroma belief movement
typeof unitsdominates,
on thepartof somestatesto assertrights
to
thatinnovation
and responsiveness
can be maximized
in appropriatefederalmoneycominginto the stateis a
a power-balance
system.
variationon this theme.Suggestionsfor state-federal,
local-federalor local-statecommissionsto study or
In intergovernmental
relations,the mostcom- adviseon thisor thatarealsovariations
on thecoopting

mon source of countervailing
power is the
federalgovernment.
Unfortunately,
relianceupon it by stateor localgovernmental
unitsmay
exacerbatetheirdependenceupon the federal
government.

theme.2

The finalbroadstrategy
ofdevolving
powerwouldbe
to allow one's own optionsto be cut.President
Carter's
freezeson federalhiringand his attemptsto cutfederal
spendingare examplesof thisstrategy
whetheror not
theyweremeantto be. Proponents
at thefederallevelof
limitingfederalspendingare intentionally
pursuing
this
Robert
strategy.
Newton's
suggestion
for
a
conscious
These strategiesconsistof the stronghelpingthe
federalism"
is also a variation
of theweakto succeed.Thus,whentheweak practiceof "administrative
strategies
try to build theirresources,the strongcan help by on the themeinasmuchas it would delineatemore
thefederalroleCongress
intendsandprevent
any
reducingtheir share of the resourcesthey hold in strictly
0
of
expansion
that
role
the
by
executive
branch.3
common.For example,theymightreducetheirowntax
At the statelevel,statesfindingthemselves
withan
rates, grant tax deductionsfor taxes paid to weak
can
governmental
units,or evenshifttheirtax base entirely excessivepower advantageoverlocal governments
to eliminatetax competitionwith the weak. Private granthome rule optionswiththe most flexibleprovigrantsor investment
in the weak can be stimulated
by sionspossible.
Granted,many of these strategiesfor devolution
thestrong.Thestrongcan also helptheweaktakepower
overotherelementsof theirenvironment.
For instance, wouldbe unpopularwithsomeelementsofthepolitical
unionsmightbe restricted
in theirdealingswithweaker system.It is not "normal"foranyoneto giveup power
units of government,
or minimumwage or other willingly.If the decisionwereevermade,however,to
spreadintergovernmental
regulations
mightbe easedforweakerunits.
power aroundmoreequally,
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER
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motivational
in therelationship
investment
on thepart
of othergovernments
shouldbe involvedin thecreation
and distribution
of resourcesand services,especially
Cohesion
thosedirectedat otherunitsof government.
Therewill
Emerson defines cohesion in power relationsas be increasesin intergovernmental
exchangewhenthis
is in thefore.
strategy
Dab + Dba31
Operationsbased on the principleof
whengovernmental
Finally,
unitsaremovingto deny
2
to
other
alternatives
there
willbe seriousstructurunits,
reducingthe dependenceof one partyon anotherhave
al
impacts.
When
weak
are
the
therewillbe
advancing,
theeffectofreducing
cohesion,whilethosethatincrease
changesas theysucceedin forming
coalitions
the dependenceof one on theotherincreasecohesion. structural
and
setting
up
countervailing
the
powers.
If,
however,
Cohesion can be affectedin eitherdirectionby the
weak
are
not
there
will
be
advancing,
structural
ossificaactions of any memberin a power relation:weak,
tion as the strongreinforceand institutionalize
the
or equal.
strong,
status
quo.
In intergovernmental
thefactorofcohemanagement
sion has importantimplications.First,all else being
Conclusion
equal, thehigherthecohesionthelesstheindependence.
Thuscohesionhas to be keptin mindforthoseplanning Whenhistorianswriteabout the decade of the 70s,
they
to use IGR as a tool to achievesomepoliticalpurpose.If undoubtedly
will chroniclethe transition
of the publicsector
coordinatedactionby severalgovernments
is required, froma "do anything
at any cost" era at the beginning
of the
thenstrategies
shouldbe chosenthatincreasecohesion; decadeto an "eraoflimits"at theapproachofthe80s.32
that is, when manipulating
the power balance, the
strategist
shouldemphasizethoseoptionsthatserveto If thiscommentfroma recentissueof PublicAdminiincreasepowerratherthanto decreasedependence.On strationReviewis correct,thentheconceptsdeveloped
the otherhand,if flexibility
and freedomforisolated in thesepagesareofimmediate
importance
to thepublic
experimentation
is needed, the strategistshould use administrator
havingto cope with intergovernmental
optionsthat reducedependencemorethanthosethat issues.It becomesvitalthattherebe sometool available
increasetheother'sdependence.
to judgewhatis goingto happento theintergovernmenA secondconsideration
to be bornein mindis that, tal systemand howeachadministrator
involvedcan best
especiallyin balanced situations,partnersin highly preparehis agencyand its environment
to handlethe
cohesivepowerrelationsmustbe carefully
watched.An changingpowerrelations.The schemepresentedhere
agencylocked into a highlycohesivebond has to be does not purportto be completely
developed.It would
sensitiveto factorsin the partner's
environment
as well be improved
byincluding
analysisoftheinternal
politics
as in itsown,sincechangesimposedon thepartner
from of the governmental
organization,
althoughin a more
a thirdpartymay very likely changethe reciprocal analyticalcontextthanhas been done here.3' It does,
balancein thehighlycohesiverelationship.
however,
represent
one approachforadministrators
and
theorists
seekinga betterunderstanding
ofthedynamics
Intergovernmental
Implications
of intergovernmental
relationships
and of thestrategies
availableto maximizeserviceto societyin themidstof a
Finally,power-dependence
analysiscan predictwhat systemin flux.
structural
effectseach kindof power-manipulating
strategywill have. Whengovernmental
Notes
unitsare tryingto
developtheirown alternatives,
therewill be a risein
competitionfor resourcesand for clients.Since this
1. Allen Pritchard,
Jr., Editorial,Nation's Cities (August,
operationwill only becomedominantwhensourcesof
1972), p. 12, as qhoted in Deil Wright,
Understanding
supplyand customersor clientsare relatively
plentiful,
Intergovernmental
Relations
(North
Sciutate,
Mass.: Duxthereshould be an expansionin government
services.
buryPress,1978),p. 317.
Note thatthisdoes notmeanthestruggle
overresources
2. Wright,
chapter1.
will cease in timesof government
cutback;rather,in
3. JamesThompson,Organizations
in Action (New York:
situationsapproaching
"freemarket"competition,
the
McGraw-Hill,
1967),pp. 26, 27.
role of government
willbe underpressureto expandas
4. Thompson,
pp. 27, 28.
the variousunits of government
5. Note thatin thisessaywe are speakingof relativepower
tryto improvetheir
morethanabsolutepower.It shouldbe keptin mindthat
power positionby developingalternateresourcesand
changesin relativepowerstructures
can takeplace in the
clients.
context
of an increaseor decreasein thetotalpowerofthe
Whengovernmental
unitsare movingto reducetheir
entiresystem.
own motivationalinvestmentin goals mediatedby
6. RichardEmerson,"Power-Dependence
Relations,"
Ameriothers,therewill be a developing
ideologyof indepencanSociological
Review(February,
1972),
p.
32.
denceand a senseof limits.Thereshouldbe reductions 7. David R.
et al., Organizational
Hampton,
Behaviorand the
in governmental
activitywhenthisstrategy
is dominant.
Practiceof Management
(Glenview,
Ill.: Scott,Foresman,
Unitsof government
thatare tryingto increasethe
1978),p. 75.
thesewouldbe someof theoptionsavailable.
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20. Thompson,
p. 35.
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21. Thompson,
p. 31.
He
definescost reduction
as efforts
on thepartof an actorin
22. Wright,
p. 150.
power relationsto minimizethe cost of dependenceon
23. Blau,pp. 118-125.
otheractorseitherby aligning
one's ownvalueswiththose 24. Thompson,
p. 32.
of theother,orbyimproving
one'sownoperations
to make 25. RichardHodes,"The NeglectedArtof State-Federal
Relathemmoreefficient.
This distinction
is not veryusefulin
tions,"State Legislatures(January/February,
1978), pp.
intergovernmental
powerrelations.For governments,
the
7-9.
"efficiency"
aspect of cost reductionhas the effectof
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by DanielElazarin Carol Steinback,"The
freeingup resourcesfor use elsewhereand of buildinga
of theStates:AnInterview
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withDanielElazar,"
foreffectiveness
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whichmayopendoorsto new
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(January/February,
1978),pp.5, 6.
sources.The "values"partofcostreduction
willbe covered 27. MortonGrodzins,"Centralization
and Decentralization
in
in our more detailedanalysesof the manipulation
of
the American
FederalSystem,"in RobertA. Goldwin,A
motivational
investment,
although
we willspeakof it there
Nationof States(Chicago:RandMcNally,1963), pp. 1-23.
in termsofideologies
rather
thancostreduction.
28. As summarized
inWright,
pp. 3, 4.
11. Citedin Thompson,
p. 31.
29. Neal Pierce,"FederalPreemption
and the States'Role,"
12. ChaxlesLevine,"Organizational
Declineand CutbackManStateGovernment
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Review (July/August 30. RobertD. Newton,"Administrative
Public
Federalism,"
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Administration
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1978),pp. 252-256.
ResistDecline"can be predicted
usingpowerdependence 31. Emerson,
p. 34.
analysis.
32. JohnJ. McTighe,"Management
Strategiesto Deal with
13. For a fuller
accountoftheLakewoodPlan,see RobertBish,
Shrinking
Resources,"
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Strategiesin Power Relationships
ACTORS
Alternatives
Developing
Alternatives

Decreasing
Motivational
Investment
Increasing
Others'
Motivational
Investment

Denying
Alternatives
to Others

Strategiesof
Strategiesof
the Strong
Strategiesof
the Weak
Equals
(Normal)
-Build alter- -Keep alter-Forestall
nate sources
nate sources
coalitionsof
-Build alterand clienteles others
nate clienteles open
-Forestall re-Reduce costs -Reduce costs
strictive
-Control other -Be alertto
regulation
elementsin
changesin
-Reduce costs
environment close others

Strategiesof
the Strong
Cohesion
(Devolving)
-Reduce own
Declines
shareof common
resources
-Nurture alternate
resourcesforthe
weak
-Shield weak from
theirenvironment
-Help weak
reduce costs
Build ideology Maintainreadi- RemainindifferRefrainfromoffer-Declines
of doing
ness to do
ent to what
ingnew programs
without
without
othersoffer
to weak
-Contract
-Coopt

-Take initiative-Maintain
-Contract
ideologyvaluingthings
underown
control
-Offer new
services
-Offerspecial
deals
-Build
-Contract
-Maintain
coalitions
-Keep doors
monopoly
-Build counter- open to coali- -Contract
vailingpower tion,appeal
-Institutionto voters
alize
hierarchy

Structural
Effects

Economic
Condition

-Competition Plenty
-Expansion of
government
services

-Sense of limitsScarcity
-Reduction of
government
role

-Give away vital Grows
responsibilities
-Create advisory
groupsrepresentingweak

-Exchange
Plenty
-Growth of
intergovernmentalactivity

-Limit own
authorityand
resources
-Give home-rule
options

-Structural
Scarcity
change(weak
advancing)
-Structural
ossification
(weak not
advancing)

Grows
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